Introduction
New Public Management (NPM) policies have been introduced across most OECD countries from the 1980s, in response to concerns about rising healthcare expenditures, fueled by technological and medical advances in treatment, as well as an aging population (Acerete et al. 2011; Simonet, 2013) . In Spain, NPM reforms were first introduced into the healthcare system from the early 1980s, in parallel with political decentralization 1 . Decentralization allowed Spain´s 17 regional governments to gain autonomy as regards decisions to introduce or reinforce NPM into healthcare, including the adaptation of new hospital management models, such as different forms of Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008) .
Since then, regional governments in Spain have increasingly introduced NPM reforms into healthcare, particularly in Catalonia and, at an accelerated rate, in Madrid (Gallo and Gené-Badia, 2013) . We argue Madrid is now positioning itself at the vanguard of NPM healthcare implementation in the context of the European Union.
This paper focuses on the reform of hospitals belonging to the Madrid Regional Health Service (SERMAS). After first emulating healthcare reforms in the UK, Madrid has now overtaken the British model, particularly as regards the use of new hospital management formulas, through the implementation of purchaser/provider split, use of PPPs, contracting out and the introduction of competition between hospitals. Moreover, reforms in Madrid have gained increased traction during the ongoing economic and financial crises. Nevertheless, the implementation of healthcare reform has been controversial and witnessed widespread protest by citizens and professionals. In particular, the ongoing attempt to contract out clinical services delivery in six public hospitals has sparked popular criticism (Legido-Quigley et al., 2013) . A popular movement formed by doctors, nursing staff and citizens -the so-called "white tide" -took the streets in Madrid several times from November 2012, but, despite the massive popular opposition, the contracting out plan is still going ahead (Garcia Rada, 2013) .
1 Decentralization took place during the 1980s and 1990s, transferring powers in healthcare management gradually across the different Spanish regions, firstly to Catalonia (1981) , Andalucia (1984) , the Basque Country and Valencia (1987) , Galicia and Navarra (1990) and the Canary Islands (1993) . The healthcare decentralization process ended in January 2002, in which the devolution of autonomy and power from the central government to all regional governments was completed (Petmesidou and Guillen, 2008) .
Policy-makers and scholars have argued that NPM techniques would increase efficiency in the health care sector, by introducing criteria from private sector management into traditional methods of public administration (Mayston, 1999) . In the Spanish context, policymakers have used repeatedly the efficiency improvement argument to introduce new management formulas in healthcare delivery (Garcia Rada, 2011) .
Theory suggests that NPM-related policies may enhance the efficiency of public service delivery, such as healthcare provision (for a comprehensive overview of NPM and efficiency, see Andrews, 2013) . However, the benefits of NPM-related tools in healthcare delivery have been already questioned from an international perspective (see, for example, Ferrari, 2006; Pollock et al., 2011; Acerete et al., 2012; Barlow et al., 2013 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section synthesizes the main NPMstyle policies implemented in Spanish hospitals, with a particular focus on Madrid. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology used for inference. Section 4 reports the analysis results and interprets them. Section 5 concludes, summarizing our findings, their policy implications and possible directions for further research.
New hospital management models
In 1996, the government of the ruling conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular) approved
Royal Decree 10/1996 3 allowing for the use of new hospital management models, with the explicit aim of "introducing more flexible organizational formulas, in order to meet the demands of efficiency and social profitability of public resources". Soon afterwards, Law 15/1997 -the result of the parliamentary processing of Royal Decree 10/1996 -stated that provision and management of health services could be carried out also through agreements or contracts with public or private entities. This allowed for the entry of private providers into public healthcare delivery.
As a consequence, the process of introduction of NPM-related policies in public healthcare and contracts with privately owned hospitals. In the Spanish context, the use of these new management models aimed to increase the health system efficiency. This would occur firstly by solving the perceived problems caused by public law and statutory personnel regime (Martin, 2003) . Public law and civil servant statutory regime were considered two key obstacles to achieve efficiency gains, since it was believed that public law was too rigid to promote the system dynamism and statutory regime prevented to incorporate productivity and efficiency tools, such as performance related pay, into personnel management (Informe Abril, 1991) . Secondly, the separation of purchaser and provider aimed to promote the creation of an internal market and the disaggregation of public sector units. It has been suggested that the separation purchaser / provider helps to improve efficiency, by introducing market incentives into the public healthcare sector management (Street, 1994) and the introduction of contracts (Gallego, 2000) . Moreover, disaggregation of public sector units is considered a fundamental tool to make former monolithic and over-bureaucratized organizations become more flexible, controllable and manageable by professional managers (Andrews, 2013).
In addition, allowing the entry of private providers was supposed to have positive effects as regards efficiency improvements because of the relatively superior efficiency of the private sector over the public one, a view which justified much of the privatization movement (Clifton et al, 2006) . A key argument when explaining the perceived superior efficiency of the private sector is the view that private firms may have more incentives to innovate because, unlike the public sector, innovations may generate benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) .
Based on these arguments, this paper will focus on the following research question: are new management formulas more efficient than traditional ones as regards hospital management? To answer this question, we turn now to the data and methodology of our study.
Data and methodology

The data
The data used in this study was obtained from the Spanish Hospital Survey (ESRI) 5 
Measuring technical efficiency and methodology
When talking about public sector efficiency, and thus public healthcare efficiency, one may distinguish three dimensions of efficiency; allocative, distributive and productive or technical (Andrews, 2013) . Clearly, a full-scale, comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency of new management formulas in the healthcare system would require evaluation of all three efficiency dimensions but, because of lack of reliable data, we focus only in one of those dimensions for which we have enough data; productive or technical efficiency. The concept of technical efficiency reflects the seminal notion of efficiency by Farrell (1957) : Input oriented efficiency indicates the ability of each Decision Making Unit (DMU) (in our case hospitals) to minimize input consumption for a given level of output, while -alternatively -output oriented efficiency indicates the ability of each DMU to maximize the output within a certain fixed level of inputs.
In this paper, we propose to apply the DEA methodology initially developed by Charnes et al.
(1978) -and extended by Banker (1984) and Banker et al. (1984) -to assess the relative 5 Retrieved from: http://www.msssi.gob.es/estadisticas/microdatos.do technical efficiency of the sample of 25 hospitals belonging to the SERMAS. In the hospital sector, DEA methods have been the most common approach when measuring technical efficiency (Hollingsworth 2003 (Hollingsworth , 2008 .
Briefly, the DEA methodology is an extension of linear programming which allows us to develop an efficient frontier for each DMU. The DEA estimation procedure consists of solving for each DMU an optimization problem via linear programming. The efficient frontier is represented by convex combinations of efficient DMUs. The rest of inefficient firms or DMUs are "wrapped" by the efficient frontier considering that deviations from the efficient frontier are due to technical inefficiency. One of the main advantages of the DEA methodology is that it allows considering multiple inputs and outputs simultaneously, which makes it particularly attractive in the case of hospitals. Additionally, it requires no assumptions about the functional form of the production frontier, which reduces the theoretical needs when specifying the model (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009 ).
The first question that arises when selecting the model is its orientation, in the sense that either the inputs or outputs are considered exogenous and beyond the control of hospital management (2008) also argued that, in most countries, the emphasis is more on controlling costs rather than on increasing demand of health services, which seems to be the case of Madrid. Based on these arguments we consider that an input orientation is the most suitable for our study.
A second question of interest when formulating the model is the returns to scale assumption. In this paper, we assume Variable Returns to Scale (VRS), which seems appropriate when it is not feasible to assume that all DMUs are operating at an optimal scale (Banker et al, 1984) .
Following Jacobs et al. (2006) and Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009) , in the hospital sector issues such as imperfect competition, budgetary constraints and/or regulatory constraints may result in DMUs operating at an inefficient scale size, thus assuming constant returns to scale may be a strong assumption.
Another concern when selecting our model is that DEA models require a careful selection of inputs and outputs, so the selection of variables is another crucial step when implementing DEA methods. The selection of inputs and outputs has been conditioned by our sample size 8 , and variable selection was based on previous studies (see O'Neill et al., 2008) . As inputs, we have used the number of beds, number of full-time employed physicians and the number of full-time nursing staff. The number of beds is a proxy for hospital size and capital investment and has been the most widely used input in hospital efficiency studies. The number of physicians and nursing staff are proxies for hospitals' labor and human capital.
As outputs, we have considered the number of discharges and the number of outpatient visits.
However, in a production process not every output may be classified as desirable, and the inclusion of only desirable outputs may not reflect the true technical efficiency of a DMU. In the case of hospital efficiency, two clear examples of undesirable outputs are the death of a patient during treatment and readmission of patients, both outputs used in some studies as proxies for quality of outcome (see, for example, Bilsel and Davutyan, 2011; Arocena and Prado, 2007; Sahin and Ozcan, 2000) . In this study, we have included in our model those two undesirable outputs; in-hospital mortality rate and the ratio between patient readmissions and discharges. Further, the four outputs (desirables and undesirables) are case-mix adjusted to control for complexity differences between hospitals, using hospitals' average weights based upon the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system. A summary of variable definitions and their measurement is provided in Table A1 while Table A2 reports descriptive statistics for those variables. Hospitals are grouped into ADM or NMM according to their management formula.
Modeling undesirable outputs has been object of considerable discussion in the efficiency literature. Following Hua and Bian (2007) , when modeling undesirable outputs the choice between strong and weak disposability of undesirable outputs has an important effect on DMU's efficiency. Briefly, strong disposability assumes that undesirable outputs are freely disposable, i.e., it is possible to reduce undesirable output without any cost, in terms of reducing also desirable outputs. On the contrary, weak disposability refers to those situations when a reduction of undesirable output forces a lower production of desirable one, i.e., reducing undesirable output is only possible at some cost, in terms of desirable output (for a comprehensive overview on this topic see Färe and Grosskopf, 2004) . Here, since we consider undesirable outputs also as a proxy for service quality, we assume strong disposability of undesirable outputs because intra-hospital mortality rates and re-admission ratios could be reduced just by improving service quality and not necessarily at the cost of reducing desirable outputs.
Under strong disposability of undesirable outputs, different approaches to deal with those outputs have been proposed in the efficiency literature; these approaches have been usually classified into direct and indirect ones (Bilsef and Davutyan, 2011) . Indirect approaches transform the values of undesirable outputs by a linear monotone decreasing transformation, thus transformed undesirable outputs can be treated as desirable (Hua and Bian, 2007 Direct approaches avoid data transformation and use the original data. Liu et al. (2010) argued that under strong disposability assumptions there is no need to transform the data and, it is enough to consider undesirable outputs as desirable inputs. Liu et al. (2010:178) consider this approach very effective because of its "simplicity" and "elegance", although they recognize that it may not reflect the true production process since it changes the input-output relationship.
Because of the lack of consensus in the efficiency literature about the most appropriated approach to deal with undesirable factors, under strong disposability of undesirable outputs, we define seven different DEA-BCC models, by maintaining all inputs and desirable outputs fixed in all models, and combining different approaches to deal with undesirable outputs and the number of undesirable outputs 9 . Table A3 reports the seven different models.
Dealing with undesirable outputs is not our only concern; Wilson (1998, 2000) proved that standard DEA estimates may be biased upwards, because of sampling noise ignoring issues. To overcome this problem, we employ the DEA homogeneous bootstrap methods described in Wilson (1998, 2000) .
Once we get the DEA efficiency scores for the SERMAS general hospitals, we analyze the differences in technical efficiency between traditional and new managed hospitals by means of two different methodologies; a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test and an analysis of bootstrapped average efficiency confidence intervals computed on the previous stage. Table 2 shows results for the standard and bootstrapped DEA models 10 . For each model the first column shows the estimates of the relative efficiency scores without bias correction for each hospital (β i ), while the second column shows bootstrap bias-corrected efficiency scores 9 Including in our model 3 inputs and 4 outputs may be too close to the so-called "rule of thumb", so we defined also alternative models ignoring undesirable outputs or including just one.
Results
estimates (bias β i ). 
Conclusions
As a consequence of rising healthcare expenditures and the ongoing economic crisis, the issue of public healthcare sector efficiency is once again on top of the policy agenda across many regional governments in Spain. Despite of the lack of conclusive empirical evidence, the adoption of NPM-related policies in healthcare management is still on the rise.
This paper sought to assess whether the use of new managerial tools led to improvements in technical efficiency for a sample of 25 hospitals belonging to the SERMAS. Our results suggest that there is no difference in terms of technical efficiency between traditionally managed hospitals and those adopting new management formulas and, there are always different management models among the more -and less -efficient hospitals. These findings remained unchanged when using different DEA models and different statistics analysis, calling
into question if what actually matters is the management model or, on the contrary, particular managers' practices.
What policy lessons can be extracted from our findings? Firstly, since we do not find any evidence of efficiency gains by adopting NPM-related policies in Madrid's public hospitals, we suggest that, policymakers should be extremely cautious when adopting these policies, particularly those involving the private sector, such as different forms of PPPs. If a private firm does not generate profits by improving the efficiency, profit maximization incentives may have a downward effect on service quality, especially when service quality is difficult to measure (Hart et al., 1997) . Moreover, in a non-efficiency gains scenario, private firms may have strong incentives to raise the prices charged to governments when renegotiating contracts (the so-called This not only has costs, it also gives the private firm -with its incentives to maximize profits -to raise the prices charged to governments (Jensen and Stonecash, 2005) us from including additional input and output measures which may better reflect the true hospital production process. In addition, the cross-section nature of the data does not permit us to analyze efficiency changes over time which may of interest when analyzing healthcare reform effects. Next steps for future research include overcome some of these limitations by employing additional years as soon as new data is available. It would be of interest also to answer one of the questions raised from this study; the drivers of healthcare reform implementation in Spain, with a particular focus on the following issue: is there any correlation between the "revolving door" effect and the adoption of contracting out policies in healthcare? 
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